Showing posts with label Sibiir. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sibiir. Show all posts

22 April 2024

‘To your tents, O Israel!’

Readers of this blog will know how attached I am, at both a level of religious sentiment and at a level of cultural sympathy, to the Evenki people of Siberia. Take a look, if you will, at this sketch, drawn by a gold prospector in Siberia whose name has been lost to time, of an Evenki church.
Accompanying this sketch, Yu V Klitsenko writes:
The fund of the Krasnoyarsk Regional Museum of Local Lore preserved this sketch from pre-revolutionary Russia. The inscription reads: ‘Christian temple of the Tungus nomads on the river Iochimo’. The Tungus temple was sketched by an anonymous artist in forest lands belonging to the Evenkil, in the northern gold mining complex in the Yenisei Basin, north of the modern North Yenisei district of the Krasnoyarskii Krai.

MS Batashev, who first published this document, reports:

In the indigenous peoples’ ethnography fund of the KRMLL, a pen sketch is stored under manifest number 1610-3. The sketch shows a square building with a square building with a hipped roof, installed on an elevated platform. Behind the structure there is a log section with six ‘legs’, on which three eight-pointed Orthodox crosses are erected. In appearance, the log is close to some figures of the so-called ‘shamanic chum*’ – a ‘kalir’ (mythical giant wild deer) installed in the darpe gallery, or to the mythical shamanic elk, whose image was located in the onang gallery. The caption under the picture reads: ‘Christian temple [chram] of the Tungus nomads on the river Iochimo’. From the materials of the manifest, it is only known that the drawing was received by the fund in 1923 from a certain AS Gobov through museum employee AA Savel’eva. But, judging from the style of the signature, the sketch itself was made much earlier, even in pre-revolutionary times. This dating is supported also by the fact that the sketch is wrapped in a sheet torn from some printed bibliography, in which the latest date of the publications listed is 1893.

Iochimo is a small river in the Velmo Basin, the region of the North Yenisei gold mines. Already by the middle of the 19th century there were 97 mines in this area, employing 22,000 people. Of course, the influence of Orthodox culture on the local Tungus population here was much stronger than in any other region of the North Yenisei, and the evident result of this was the appearance of such a structure, meeting both local conditions and the tastes of the local population.
Apart from this brief commentary, we have no further information about the origin of the portrayal, and the ‘Sitz in Leben’ of the building depicted on it.

The refusal to question the content of the inscription and the conviction that the Tungus structure in the drawing was indeed, at least from the perspective of the Evenkil of the Iochimo River, Christian, were accepted as an operating principle of the study. Indirect signs of the Christian nature of the building include the image of the three crosses, in the absence of ‘
homokonov’ and other idols usual for shamanic prayer sites…
From the description of this The Evenki people had (and, God willing, will have again!) a unique approach to Christian worship that conformed to their nomadic-pastoralist lifestyle. The temple is on an elevated platform, of the sort that would be used by steppe peoples for shamanic ceremonies and ritual dances. The people would be gathered outside and underneath, in their yurts or their hide tents. They would offer prayers for successful hunts or for successful migrations. Because they lived in Siberia, success was not guaranteed for either, and failure often meant death.

The poles upon which the temple stood, would be ornately adorned with icons of Christ, the Theotokos and various Russian saints, as well as prayer flags and tokens of offering. The Evenkil revered Christ as the ultimate Shaman--the Son of God who rescues the souls of all the dead at the cost of His own life. The worship of the Theotokos and the saints fit into the Evenki worldview as well, for of course the supreme God has helpers who can guide reindeer to good grazing areas, or keep hunters safe in the taiga forests.

Baptism also made a degree of intuitive sense to Evenki worshippers, as the cosmology of traditional Evenki religion involves a great river that stands between this world and the next, which all men must cross if they are to live on in the other world.

As well, the Evenki erected these large wooden crosses in front of such churches in memory of the dead.

Such temporary, small, portable places of worship would have been instantly recognisable to the (likewise nomadic-pastoralist) ancient Hebrews. God lived in a Tabernacle in the desert: that is to say, he lived in a tent, a ‘chum’. The love of the Evenkil for their marginal taiga lands, and for the reindeer with whom they lived in symbiosis, would have been understandable to, and approved by, the authors of the Hebrew Scriptures, who were of course biased toward the way of life of the shepherd.

It would seem, or rather it is to be hoped, that at least some of these churches survived, it seems, up until the Revolution... and not much further on than that. The aggressive atheism of the early Soviets did not permit the Evenki to worship Christ.

But, what a loss to the Christian world are such churches! That is not, of course, to say the building. The building was not, and never was, important. Indeed, it seems meant to be taken down and put up somewhere else. But rather, what a loss to the Christian world are the tent-gatherings of Indigenous peoples who could hear the words of Scripture, unfiltered by some self-serving colonialist missionary’s ‘interpretation’!

And thus, what a shame indeed, that Western Protestants (and Evangelicals in places like South Korea) are still trained think of the Evenki and other nomadic groups as ‘unreached people’, that they seek to turn into sedentary, suit-and-tie-wearing, joyless and self-righteous bourgeois children of hell like themselves. Give me the shamanism-inflected indigenous Evenki Christianity any day of the week, over the religion of such ‘missionaries’.

* ‘Chum’ is an ethnographical term for ‘a portable dwelling of nomadic reindeer herders in the form of a conical frame made of poles, covered with skins, birch or other bark’, similar to the tipi used by the people of the Seven Council Fires, or the wigwam used by the Anishinaabeg.

05 April 2022

How the war is impacting Sápmi


In Arctic news, Sámi activist and anti-war protester Andrei Danilov is currently seeking (and being denied) asylum in Norway. Norway’s government claims that it cannot offer him asylum because he currently has a Swiss visa. But his case shows rather clearly, and sadly, how the current war is dividing Sápmi from itself, as the four states which encompass the Sámi nation draw up battle lines between them. Norway is a NATO member; and although Sweden and Finland are not formally aligned with NATO, their governments have certainly drifted closer to the NATO sphere in recent years.

Within Russia, Sámi opinion appears to be deeply divided, just as it is among the rest of the Russian population. Hard polling data among Kildin Sámi in Murmansk Oblast are not readily available on this particular question, but it seems reasonable to assume that there is a significant ‘Z’ contingent, a small but vocal anti-war contingent, and a solid majority between them who simply don’t want to get into trouble.

There is a substantial body of anecdotal literature to back up this trifurcated view. A significant number of Sámi within Russia, such as Anna Igontova (one of the three elected representatives of the Russian section of the Sámirađđi since 2018), have come out in favour of Russia’s ‘special military operation’. So has Kola’s Sámi Association, and the Russian Arctic indigenous advocacy organisation RAIPON. Others, like Andrei Danilov and exile organisations like ICIPR, are coming out strongly against Russia’s assault on the Ukraine. In addition, RAIPON and ICIPR have issued statements questioning each other’s legitimacy and right to speak on behalf of the indigenous peoples of the Russian north.

First order: this is truly heart-breaking, and it should be so for anyone interested in the welfare of indigenous peoples in the Arctic or anywhere else. What we are seeing is the instrumentalisation of indigenous concerns to prop up political actions elsewhere that they, prima facie, have nothing to do with. We should condemn equally this instrumentalisation, whether it comes from the Russian government, or the governments of NATO-aligned countries like Norway and Germany. It seems to me that both NATO and Russia are now actively playing the same chess game over the Arctic.

Second order: we need to understand why the Russian government gets the kind of support it does from RAIPON and other organisations like the Kola Sámi Association, which come the closest to actually democratically representing the Skolt, Kildin and Ter Sámi peoples within Russia. It isn’t enough to take the ‘official dissident’ line that these organisations are merely suborned by the Russian state to suit its own ends, though clearly a significant degree of political pressure has been applied there. As a broad generalisation: Russia’s indigenous nations have been active supporters of the current government for a number of years now, including on questions like the recent revisions to the Russian Constitution.

The first thing we need to understand about this, is that Russia’s smaller ethnic nations have by and large carefully cultivated a sense of civic nationalism that is defensively oriented against the ethnic nationalism perpetrated on some of the seedier corners of the Russian far-right. A careful distinction has to be made here between the terminology of ‘russkii’ (русский) and ‘rossiiskii’ (российский). English doesn’t preserve this linguistic distinction, and translates both terms as ‘Russian’. The first term is an ethnic designation. The ethnic ‘Big’ Rus’ of Novgorod, Pskov, Moscow, Tver, Ryazan, Rostov and so forth; the ‘White’ Rus’ of Minsk and Polotsk and Turov; the ‘Little’ Rus’ of Galich and Volhynia; and the Carpathian Rus’ of Užhorod and Maramoroš—are all русский. The second term, российский, is a civic designation. The idea behind российский is that you can be Tatar, Nenets, Nivkh, Ket, Evenki, Sakha, Tuva, Buryat, Selkup, Bashkir, Chuvash, Chechen, Dagestani, Adyghe or Sámi, and still be every bit as российский as this guy on YouTube.

The entire concept of российский civic-nationalism was eagerly embraced by most Russian indigenous groups, precisely because—in the wake of the collapse of the concept of the ‘new Soviet man’—the российский self-identifier was all that stood between them and oblivion. And this, of course, in a time when a great swathe of Russia’s ethnic-Russian population was also facing oblivion at the hands of a clique of neoliberal capitalist economists who literally left millions of them to starve or die deaths of despair, and of a government which had been rendered powerless to assist them. Perhaps ironically, this shared suffering between the русский-Russians and the post-Soviet, newly-российский indigenous peoples in the nineties, helped to forge a new sense of sympathy and solidarity between them.

But the generalised atmosphere of grievance also brought out the worst in some of the far-right enthusiasts for Руси-as-opposed-to-Россия. Ethnic violence in Russia, many of the organised forms of it being associated with the far-right ‘Russian March’ (of which Western liberal darling Aleksei Navalnyi has been a staunch supporter and for which support he has never apologised), peaked in the early 2000s. This allowed Putin—whether genuinely or cynically—to position himself as a defender of the interests of all россияне, when he cracked down on the ‘Russian March’ and its associated far-right ethnic extremism. This strategy worked—spectacularly. In the words of Mikhail Alekseev, writing for Edinburgh University Press:

Putin has faced practically no ethnic minority backlash over his Ukraine policy since the autumn of 2013. No survey or other systematic data on the issue have been available, but the reputable Levada Centre poll of 20–23 March 2014 showed that 88 per cent of Russia’s population (+/− a sampling error of 3.4 per cent) backed what the questionnaire described as ‘Crimea’s joining of Russia’. Only 6 per cent of those surveyed opposed it (Levada Centre 2014b). In a telephone ‘megasurvey’ of 48,590 Russians in eighty- three provinces, conducted on 14–16 March 2014 by the independent but government-loyal Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) and the Kremlin-run VTsIOM service, 91 per cent of the respondents sup- ported, and only about 5 per cent opposed, Crimea’s annexation. In all but one of the predominantly non-Russian ethnic republics (Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino- Balkaria, Karachaevo- Cherkessia, Mari El, North Ossetia, Tatarstan and Tyva) residents polled in the megasurvey supported Crimea’s annexation at about the same rate as residents of Russia did on average, plus or minus three percentage points.

Ultimately, then, the political strategy of the indigenous nations of Russia is entirely a defensive one. This is understandable. They naturally distrust the elements of the far-right that seemed to have gained in prominence in the late 1990s and early 2000s. They also view liberal politicians as (to put it politely) unreliable, both because they backed the economic policies that immiserated Russians of all ethnicities, and because they flocked to the same politics of grievance as the far-right did when Putin came to power in 2000. They may not, and as seen from some of the anecdotal evidence above clearly do not unanimously, support all of Putin’s policies. But their political options are few and unenviable.

A side note here. People in Russia are not stupid, and they do have access to foreign news media. Among the Finno-Ugric nations of the Russian Federation (including not only the Sámi but also the Karelians, Veps, Votes, Ingrians, Erzyans, Mokshas, Maris, Udmurts, Permian-Komis, Mansis and Khants) in particular, I would imagine that the hateful racialist rhetoric coming out of, for example, the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance toward Finnic-Ugric peoples in general probably hasn’t won them many friends in that quarter. Now, of course, I’m not a Mari, nor am I a Moksha, nor anything in between. But if I were, I’d imagine it would be rather hard for me to sympathise with Ukrainians who consider me a barbarous Asiatic element that has contaminated historical Muscovy and are thus the distant historical scapegoats for all of their political woes. Note also how this charge echoes the grievance-politics of русский far-right ethno-nationalism. In fact, I’d probably be more willing to tolerate the annoying and somewhat-creepy sexualised patronisation of probably otherwise well-intentioned filmmakers like Aleksei Fedorchenko, than I would the caliper-wielding eliminationism of the race-purists who publish material for Ukrainian government ministries.

In addition, I would imagine that a lot of ethnic minorities in Russia are carefully scrutinising, insofar as they are able, how the ethnic Hungarians (also speakers of a Finno-Ugric language), Romani and Jews are currently being treated inside the Ukraine… in part because they fear that a resurgent русский ethno-nationalism could lead to the same treatment in Russia. They see Hungarians essentially being kicked out of their schools in Transcarpathia. (To get an idea of how unpopular the Ukrainian national cause is in Hungary because of this, consider: Hungary is a member of NATO and its government has, correctly, officially denounced the Russian assault. And yet, Orbán Viktor handily won his recent re-election there on a campaign promising not to send weapons into the Ukraine.) They see Roma being beaten, stripped naked, sprayed with iodine, tied to lampposts and left to freeze. And of course they see marches in honour of war criminals who perpetrated the Shoah. All of this context makes the entire narrative of Ukraine-as-hardscrabble-liberal-democracy versus Russia-as-despotic-villainous-aggressor an incredibly hard sell, particularly to ethnic minorities in Russia who remember all too well how the domestic русский ethno-nationalist far-right has treated them in the recent past.


Again, none of the foregoing is to excuse, let alone to defend, Russia’s recent actions in the Ukraine. Putin lost my support precisely when I heard that he bombed Kharkov. But some level of strategic empathy is called for in this instance. The Sámi in Russia, like other indigenous peoples there, have lived through three decades now of extreme uncertainty. If Western media imagine that they are the victims of state repression and manipulated by propaganda, one must even more so consider that the context of their very real hopes and fears rests precisely on this uncertain footing. Where can they look for defence? Not to the capitalist Western countries, who showed zero concern for their health, safety and welfare in the nineties. (Even now, Danilov is being denied asylum—see how much Norway cares for the Sámi!) Not to the old Soviet ideals—these can only be of comfort in nostalgia, in total abstraction from the present reality. And certainly not to the liberals, who happily allied themselves with the worst forms of far-right ethno-nationalist grievance politics. But if Putin fails, then they will find themselves again the scapegoats of a politics of grievance. That is not a happy place to be.

So, again, if you are a person of conscience, pray for the Sámi: whether they are pro-war, anti-war or anywhere in the middle. Pray for the Sámi in the West as well as in the East. My position, and it will continue to be my position unless and until something drastic happens, remains the same as that of the Sámirađđi: I oppose military action as unjust, I oppose escalation, I oppose punitive sanctions aimed at the civilian populace… and I advocate for a negotiated settlement that respects both Ukrainian sovereignty and Russian security.

08 January 2021

Holy New Hieromartyr Andrei, Bishop of Ufa

Saint Andrei of Ufa

The eighth of January – actually the twenty-sixth of December on the Old Calendar – is the feast-day of Saint Andrei of Ufa, the Russian catacomb saint I’ve mentioned before and also one of the earliest ‘pink priests’ in Russia during the Revolutionary period – in fact, one of the only hierarchical supporters of the moderate socialists in the government. At the same time, however, his understanding of the social question was fundamentally conservative, and much closer to that of the Slavophils than to the social-revolutionaries. He ultimately became dissatisfied with the ideology as it became more violent. Saint Andrei is well worth remembering alongside Fr Valentin Sventsitskii, with whom he shares much in common, and with Saint Tikhon of Moscow whose cause as Patriarch he championed. This is because he was, like them, considered ‘too red for the whites, and too white for the reds’. In the end, he was given a sham trial and executed by the NKVD, because he dared to criticise the ecclesiological hæresy of Sergianism and the so-called ‘Living Church’.

The following hagiographical treatment of Saint Andrei of Ufa draws heavily – both in structure and in content – upon the biographical works of him authored by Vladimir Moss (The Holy New Martyrs of Eastern Russia, 2010) and James White (Missionary, Reformer, and Old Believer in Revolutionary Russia, 2018). It also brings in the briefer treatments of his character and activities – Churchly, political and charitable – in the East by Charles Steinwedel (Threads of Empire, 2016) and Edward E Roslof (Red Priests, 2002). It is my hope that this treatment is an effective synthesis from the available English-language sources and helps to draw, in writing, as accurate an ‘icon’ of the Saint as possible.

Saint Andrei [Rus. Андрей] was born Aleksandr Alekseevich Ukhtomskii on the twenty-sixth of December in the year 1872. His family was from a village outside Rybinsk in Yaroslavl’ oblast’. The noble Ukhtomskii family could trace its roots back to the Rurikovich line of royal princes of Rus’, from which sprang many saints including Saint Olga, Saint Vladimir, Saints Boris and Gleb, Saint Andrei Bogolyubskii and Saint Aleksandr Nevskii, though he apparently also claimed some Tatar heritage. Aleksandr’s father, Aleksei, was a minor nobleman and bureaucrat who had a posting in the Russian Navy; and his mother Antonina was an ideal housewife. However, it was his governess, a former serf named Maria Pavlovna, who was most instrumental in his early development, inspiring in him both a love for God and the saints, but also a love for the Russian peasantry and their traditions. Aleksandr’s younger brother Aleksei Alekseevich Ukhtomskii would go on to become a famous psychologist; and the two brothers did not always get along with each other, but they did love each other quite deeply.

Aleksandr Ukhtomskii early on expressed an interest in the priesthood. He seems to have been inspired in this – as well as in his social activism – by the example of Saint John of Kronstadt, whose sermons he went in person to attend, and whose sweet words of encouragement directly to him regarding the awesome duties of the priesthood strengthened his desire for a life of service to the common people. However, when he announced his intentions to his family, their reaction was almost entirely negative. His uncle, also named Aleksandr, berated him harshly. His mother Antonina pleaded with him to give up his associations with priests. Out of deference to her, at first, he complied. But after his uncle Aleksandr died the following week, Antonina’s son Aleksandr took it as a sign that he must push forward with his priestly calling.

The choice to become a priest was – it cannot be emphasised enough – an act of class treason on Aleksandr’s part. His parents and uncle castigated him for his desire to join the priesthood largely out of noble pride. They didn’t want him to be associated with the ‘black clergy’, who were – very much unlike their Catholic counterparts in Western Europe – ill-compensated, ill-educated, lacking in social prestige, largely of working-class origins, and possessed of large families that they were often at pains to feed. They were very close to the peasantry they served – and in the eyes of a largely-Westernised Russian nobility this was a cause for a certain degree of revulsion. But Aleksandr, who kept in mind his governess Maria, not only did not share this revulsion, but he actively repudiated it.

At Moscow Theological Seminary he was taught first by the preeminent Bishop (later Metropolitan) Antonii (Khrapovitskii) of Kiev (who introduced the young seminarian Aleksandr to the writings of Aleksei Khomyakov and Ivan Kireevskii – the Slavophil philosophers), and subsequently by then-Archimandrite Saint Arsenii of Novgorod and Toshkent. His imagination was fired by the concept of sobornost’ and its clear resonance with the lived experience of the Russian peasantry. Aleksandr developed a ‘conservative radicalism’ that would characterise his entire career in the Church: he deeply valued the freedom of the Russian common people, but this freedom did not consist merely in legal rights and negative immunities – instead it consisted in the active giving and sharing in each other in the communal life of the rural mir or the urban artel’. The Slavophils imbued Aleksandr with a deep and abiding heartfelt faith in principles of œconomic and church organisation which may be termed as populist, consensus-based or radically-democratic. He was a lifelong opponent of both erastian tyrannies whether sæcular or confessional; as well as of clericalism, obscurantism and blind fideism in church matters.

The seminarian Aleksandr Ukhtomskii was not, however, a fan of liberal democracy and bourgeois parliamentarianism – although the arguments he marshalled against both were conservative and monarchist rather than socialist or anarcho-syndicalist in character. In Aleksandr’s thinking, Russian freedom is best preserved under a Tsar who embodies and marshals the religious energies of the people, and subsequently allows them to be directed toward their democratic-communal œconomic – though not necessarily political! – life. In Saint Andrei of Ufa’s career, we can therefore see the internal tensions of the early nineteenth-century Slavophil faith played out in a twentieth-century political context. He admired the Christian radicalism of early Kievan Rus’, and even the ‘concentrated’ holiness of the Tsardom of Moscow. But – unlike Dostoevskii, for example – he utterly detested Peter the Great and his transformation of the Church into a mere bureau of government. It was against the Synodal system inaugurated by Peter that he bent all of his energies during his clerical career until the appointment of Patriarch Saint Tikhon; and thereafter against the attempts by Stalin’s government to restore a similar arrangement under the ‘Living Church’ and Metropolitan Sergii.

Aleksandr Ukhtomskii became tonsured as a monk shortly after graduating from seminary, and took on the monastic name of Andrei. He had baulked at the idea of marriage, which would be expected of a ‘black priest’ prior to ordination, because he subconsciously held all women to the unreachably-high standard set by his favourite female saint, Nino of Georgia. Once he was tonsured as a monk he became vigorously active in promulgating the Gospel – in word and in deed. He had the utmost ceremonial reverence for the Holy Mysteries, and for the Scriptures. But he was equally beloved for his service to the poor and needy. Whenever he was given a gift by a rich admirer – fresh fruit, for example – he gave it at once to a hungry person or someone in need. He kept a strict ascetic routine, fasted and prayed constantly, and slept upon a hard bed without the benefit of blanket or pillow.

The new monk Andrei was sent out first as a missionary-inspector to Ossetia. The Ossetians, an Iranian-speaking people of the Caucasus descended from the Scythians, the Sauromatai and the Alans, were at that time divided between Orthodoxy, Islâm and the local rodnoverie. Andrei saw his work there being, not to spread Russian civilisation or to proselytise the Ossetians, but instead to develop Church materials and sæcular readers in the local Ossetian language, to promote education, and to love the people without ulterior motives. A major proponent of this model of Orthodox missiology, which had been first promoted by Saint Innocent of Irkutsk, was the lay professor and Turcologist Nikolai Il’minskii. Saint Andrei followed this model religiously – so to speak – even though it led him into conflicts with right-wing Russian nationalists. As he himself put it:
I am convinced that even if the Orthodox Chuvash, Mari, Udmurts and baptised Tatars do not know a word of Russian but are only loyal sons of the Church, then they will always love the Russian Orthodox tsar, serve their Orthodox fatherland, worship its holy saints, defend the Holy Church from insult, and so on. In a word, being enlightened by the light of Christianity through their [own] languages, the inorodtsy can be Russian patriots!
Saint Andrei was a fierce critic of trends in the society he deemed to be materialistic and selfish. In something of a throwback to Saint John Chrysostom’s tirade against circuses and hippodromes, he critiqued the Russian obsession with the theatre as a pagan idol which took the place of and distracted people from the Christian Liturgy. Also, like Saint Misail of Ryazan, he wedded a social witness against exploitation and violence to a moralistic witness against drunkenness. But he reserved some of his harshest invective for the spirit of capitalism which he saw descending upon Russia. He called capitalism an ‘egotistic order’ and a ‘deeply anti-cultural phenomenon’, parasitic on Christian history but antagonistic to Christian love.

He therefore welcomed some of the reforms that the 1905 constitutional crisis in Russia brought about, but by no means all. By this time he had been appointed as an abbot of the Monastery of the Holy Transfiguration in Kazan. By 1907 he would be consecrated to the new bishopric of Mamadysh. He had run-ins with revolutionary upheaval in Kazan, when he broke up a riot at a gunpowder factory that had turned violent and killed one man. He had grown to love and respect the Bashkir and Tatar people amongst whom he lived, and he welcomed the new law that allowed for freedom of conscience among the Russian people – seeing it as an opportunity for the Orthodox Church to reform itself and rededicate itself to a mission of love, without the hint of coercion behind it. He had a personal respect for the character of Konstantin Pobedonostsev, but he believed Pobedonostsev’s very office to be a Westernised abomination. And he hated the idea of intégrisme – a Church with the weapons of the state in its hand – as much as he hated the idea of Petrine erastianism. At the same time, though, he was intensely critical of the idea of a full church-state separation, seeing the public presence of the Orthodox Church being the sole bulwark against both the godless force of capitalism and against the pious reaction of Islâm as preached by Tatar and Bashkir imâms.

It is necessary to note that although Saint Andrei could be intensely critical of Islâm as a doctrine, he had a marked admiration and affection for Muslim people, similar to his mentor Saint John of Kronstadt. He admired the nobility and strength of spirit in Tatar and Bashkir men. And even his critiques of Islâm presented the faith of the ‘Hagarenes’ as a foil to a lukewarm and indifferent Orthodox Church that had lost its fire and its connexion to the hearts of the common people. As often as not, his diatribes against Islâm contained barely-veiled critiques aimed at the complacency and bureaucratic lethargy of the synodal structure of the Orthodox Church. However, his attitudes toward evangelisation of the inorodtsy led to confrontations and fights with the far-right Black Hundreds. The Black Hundreds supported ethnic Russification of the East – ‘Russia for the Russians’ – rather than the civic evangelism supported by the bishop. As a result, they hated Saint Andrei, and – though it was ill-suited for a bishop to do so, he himself citing ‘sinful thoughts’ – he returned the sentiment heartily. The clashes got to be so bad that Saint Andrei was compelled by the Church to leave Kazan for Mamadysh.
Saint Andrei kept busy. He was active in missionary work among the inorodtsy according to the Irkutsk / Il’minskii model, both in the Caucasus and in the Russian East. He was also a political activist, homilising in fiery terms against exploitation of the poor by the rich. And of course he was a steadfast advocate of Church reforms: in particular, the democratic organisation of the laity, the election of priests and bishops, and the restoration of the Russian Patriarchate.

He clashed hard with Rasputin and his toadies in the Imperial Court. From the start he had a certain distrust for this wild-eyed soi-disant ‘holy man’ with his erratic mannerisms and his mesmeric hold over the Tsarina in particular, but Saint Andrei’s personal dislike of Rasputin was cemented when the latter made a comment disparaging Saint John of Kronstadt’s personal life. From that point on, Saint Andrei became, together with Metropolitan Antonii (Khrapovitskii) a devoted opponent of the Rasputin clique in Petersburg. These clashes caused Saint Andrei to be relocated again – this time to the city of Ufa in what is now Bashkortostan.

In Ufa, Saint Andrei continued to push for Church reforms, including clerical election and the organisation of the laity. Bashkortostan was indeed a logical place for these sorts of reforms to occur, being the centre of one of the more successful coöperative movements in præ-revolutionary Russia and a long, proud history of left-wing political agitation going back to Pugachev’s Rebellion. And indeed, parish priests in Ufa were, for a short time, directly elected by their parishes under Saint Andrei’s rule. The First World War had a significant effect on Ufa as well. Although initially supportive of the causes of Russian entry into the Great War, Bishop Andrei soon came to realise that the human costs of the war far outweighed any good it might possibly bring, and his homiletics began to take on a strongly anti-war tone. Saint Andrei was actively involved in mobilising the Orthodox parishes in Ufa to care for the slow-rising flood of war orphans, refugees and wounded soldiers retreating from the Eastern Front.

Saint Andrei was active at this time in charitable and social work. He helped to found the East Russian Cultural Enlightenment Society («Восточнорусское Культурно-Просветительное Общество», VRKPO), which used its funding to sponsor schools, orphanages, libraries and hospitals throughout the Russian East from 1916 to 1919, when it was disbanded by the Soviet authorities. The VRKPO also promoted a cultural programme based on the Il’minskii system, which advocated for the cultural and linguistic rights of inorodtsy while at the same time propagating Orthodox Christianity within non-Russian speaking communities. It also promoted a moderate-left political agenda aimed at promoting financial self-sufficiency, communal credit and collective bargaining among both Russians and non-Russians living in the East. Several VRKPO members from Ufa were in fact elected to the Constitutive Assembly in 1917.

Saint Andrei’s relationship with Renovationism was complicated. He was, in fact, one of the founders – and the sole supporter and patron among the body of Orthodox bishops – of the proto-Renovationist ‘Union of Democratic Laity and Clergy’ («Союз демократического духовенства и мирян», SDDM) in Saint Petersburg in 1917. The SDDM, which was closely associated with the Socialist Revolutionary Party, sponsored and championed many of the reforms that Saint Andrei held dear: election of parish clergy, Liturgies in the vernacular, legal freedom of conscience, mobilisation of the laity in the life of the Church. It also shared Saint Andrei’s hostility to capitalism, and supported radical œconomic reforms meant to place control over Russia’s productive forces collectively in the hands of peasants and workers. In the press, Saint Andrei was called a ‘clerical Bolshevik’. It was meant as an insult, but Saint Andrei took it and wore it as a badge of honour, and supported it with reference to the Gospel of Saint Luke.

However, the SDDM was soon joined and later supplanted by several other Renovationist organisations with what today might be called accelerationist platforms. Saint Andrei perceived that these organisations, which came to coalesce into the hæretical ‘Living Church’, were aiming to attack and destroy the very sobornyi basis of the Church and subordinate it to the new Bolshevik party under a neo-Petrine, cæsaropapist political arrangement. This went against everything that Saint Andrei had lived, worked and fought for throughout his entire clerical career – and, more importantly, it went against the spirit of Christ. Saint Andrei also vehemently opposed Kerenskii’s attempts to sæcularise Russian society and break the Church away from many of the social organisations it fostered and supported – in particular the schools. He lambasted Kerenskii’s ‘atheism’ and ‘irreligion’ when he attempted to seize parish schools and convert them into state schools which would be officially neutral on questions of religion.

Similarly to Kang Youwei or Liang Shuming in China, Saint Andrei found himself out-of-step with the spirit of the times in two different ways. Prior to 1917 Saint Andrei had been a left-wing agitator, a narodnik, a champion of the rights of peasants and workers to determine their own œconomic livelihoods collectively for themselves. In the wake of 1917, Saint Andrei found himself a lonely voice for the religious conscience of the masses, for the humble piety of the same peasants and workers against a pernicious revolutionary doctrine of foreign provenance. Before, he had been a thorn in the side of the Synodal system, of the Black Hundreds, of Rasputin, of the obscurantist wings of the Tsarist clergy. Afterwards, he found himself a thorn in the side of the new and increasingly Bolshevik-dominated post-Revolutionary government… all without changing what he believed and what he stood for! He had always stood for Christ – alongside the widows, the orphans, the inorodtsy, the wounded and crippled casualties of war.

During the Civil War, in fact, Saint Andrei briefly worked for Admiral AV Kolchak of the White Navy who briefly set up a counterrevolutionary government in Siberia, helping to tend to White wounded and working to restore some semblance of order to the Church in Ufa after the Soviet takeover. Although Bishop Andrei’s personal relationship with Admiral Kolchak was good (the two sharing the same faith and many of the same convictions), the new Provisional All-Russian Government distrusted Andrei for the same reasons mentioned above: he had been a foe of the old order they were attempting to restore. As Vladimir Moss writes: ‘[Bishop Andrei] often appealed to Admiral Kolchak himself with his plan for organizing parishes throughout Eastern Russia. But he was rejected, and sometimes even persecuted. And this in spite of the fact that the supreme ruler himself greatly respected him.’

In the wake of the Soviet reconquest of the East in 1920, Saint Andrei was placed under arrest on trumped-up charges of conspiracy, and put into prison under the most heinously-confining, inhumane and health-endangering conditions. Bishop Andrei was kept alive largely by donations of food from sympathetic Orthodox Christians, which had to be kept discrete and secret from the Soviet authorities to protect the identities of his benefactors. For the rest of his life, indeed, he was very rarely out of prison. His support for the saintly Patriarch Tikhon – who indeed shared many of Saint Andrei’s social views, given his support of organised labour and the rights of Alaska Natives in the United States! – led him to share in the Patriarch’s martyrdom.
Saint Andrei had long had a weak spot, a sympathy for the Old Belief in Russia. His heartfelt distaste and opposition to the Petrine reforms, indeed, made such a sympathy more likely. But his attitude toward the ecclesiastical reforms of Patriarch Nikon, and his belief that these reforms both alienated the common people from the Church and set the stage for the erastian arrangement of the Synodal government that followed, cemented this sympathy. But in the wake of his arrest in 1920 he began to have more and more significant contacts with Old Believer communities in the East.

His conflicts with Metropolitan Sergii became much more overt and hostile, the more he began to contact with Old Believer communities in Moscow, in Ufa and in his exile in Tashkent. At length, a concelebrated Liturgy he held with a certain Old Believer monk named Kliment and an Old Believer bishop named Rufinii, caused Metropolitan Sergii to suspend him from the Orthodox hierarchy – twice. As Sergii continued to persecute him he did so without the authority of the Church and on his own initiative, without giving the beleaguered Bishop the benefit of an ecclesial trial or the benefit of witnesses on his behalf. Saint Andrei remained immensely popular in Ufa, and his return was greeted with exuberant joy by many of the people who remembered his kindness and work on their behalf. A later clerical trial exonerated Bishop Andrei of any wrongdoing and reinstated him as an Orthodox bishop.

But Saint Andrei did not forget his treatment at the hands of Metropolitan Sergii. By the time that Sergii penned his infamous Declaration swearing the Church of Russia to the Soviet authorities in the most slavish possible way, and demanding all of the bishops of the Church do the same, Saint Andrei was ready with an answer. He openly flouted the Declaration. But it is intriguing that in his rejection of Sergii’s Declaration, he attacked first and foremost Sergii’s history of obscurantism, his closeness to Rasputin and his slavishness before Tsarist authority prior to the Soviet takeover. Even as late as 1930, Saint Andrei was critiquing the Soviet-accommodationist clergy from a ‘left’ position!

Subsequent to this, he was officially barred from travelling to Ufa, to Kazan or to Siberia – largely on account of his popularity there. He was kept either in prison (where he suffered so badly from malnourishment that most of his hair fell out), or under virtual house-arrest in Moscow, where he celebrated Liturgy at one of the vanishingly-few non-Sergianist churches remaining there, and then was deported to Almaty in Kazakhstan in 1932. He met and was reconciled with Metropolitan Iosif of Petrograd. He kept up correspondence with his well-wishers and old friends in Bashkortostan and Kazan, who sent him packages with expensive gifts that – true to his character – Saint Andrei at once distributed among the poor and needy in Kazakhstan.

He was arrested one final time and transported to Moscow, held in close confinement for three years between 1934 and 1937, possibly in a labour camp near Yaroslavl’. At a secret trial held in Rybinsk – not far from where Saint Andrei was born, in fact – the NKVD found him guilty of unidentified charges which are nowhere on record, and sentenced him to death by firing squad. The sentence was carried out on the fourth of September, 1937. Saint Andrei asked – and was given – a few minutes for prayer before his execution, and a schemamonk Epifanii who was imprisoned with Saint Andrei reported that while he prayed he was bathed in light from a radiant cloud and vanished from view for several minutes. This caused great fear and bewilderment among his executioners, who hastened to carry out the punishment afterward.

Saint Andrei was glorified by ROCOR in 1981 in the Synaxis of the New Martyrs and Confessors of Russia, though there was a motion in 1993 to decanonise him based on his contacts and concelebration of the Liturgy with the Old Believers. He was posthumously pardoned and rehabilitated by the Soviet government under glasnost’ in 1989, shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Moscow Patriarchate has been a bit slow to recognise Saint Andrei despite his immense popularity locally, in Ufa and Kazan, where he is celebrated as a local saint; however, he is listed on the Church calendar, though his feast-day commemorates the day of his birth rather than the day of his martyrdom. Holy hierarch and new martyr Andrei, steadfast friend of the poor and needy, champion of the inorodtsy and bold confessor of the truth before the godless, pray unto Christ our God that our souls may be saved!

23 October 2020

The Heavy Anglo Ortho ‘Films of K-stan’ Review Series


Okay, 2020 has really been sucky enough a year as it is. But, the plague persists, and today we have also to deal with the release on Jeff Bezos’s platform of a sequel to an American nonmedy that should not have been made in the first place, and will not be named here out of general concern for good taste. In place of any consideration of either this downward-punching buffoon or his filmography, I thought it would be a good time to put together a list of the actual Kazakhstani films I have seen and reviewed on this blog. I intend to be adding to this list for the foreseeable future, so stay tuned and do not be surprised if this list grows.

The following list started out as a Kazakhstani film series, kicked off in part by my having watched the Veit Helmer comedy Baikonur and reminded of how much I liked the big ham that was Sergei Bodrov, Sr’s Nomad. Subsequently I decided to invest the time and the energy into that interest which dates back to the beginning of this blog, and explore the Kazakh film world. I found some things I did not expect there: like the linkages between Kazakh historical films and the epic poetry of Central Asia. But it soon morphed in two different, though related, directions. Films began to be added to it, like Shaman, that were focussed on the traditional cultures of Northern and Central Asia. And other films began to be added to it, like Brat, that were retrospective evaluations of the Soviet legacy and explorations of the post-Soviet condition. Obviously, these three thematic considerations overlap considerably.

Kazakhstani film is a world all its own, as I have found: as broad and vast as the country which its people inhabit. There are commercial blockbusters and pretentious art films. There are films which look to the past, films which look to the future, and even the odd film like Baikonur which manages to do both at the same time. There are films which celebrate Kazakh martial might and vigour, and there are films which lament Kazakhstan’s corrupt politics. There are directors in Kazakhstan who are incurable romantics who explore both sisterly and romantic love with a touchingly sensitive eye (Gulshat Omarova), and those who are bitter sceptics whose understanding of politics elevates a keen sense of tragœdy (Ardak Ámirqulov). From farcical comedies to psychological thrillers to gangster films to high fantasy to sweeping epic historical dramas, Kazakhstani film really does have something for everyone. Gentle reader, please do yourself a favour: go and watch one of these real Kazakhstani films, rather than that dreck which just got dumped on Amazon Prime.

Here is the full list of films I have done in this series, in chronological order by year of release.

~~~

Films of Kazakhstan:
Amangeldy (1938)†
Ivan Groznyi [Ivan the Terrible] (1944)
Pervyi eshelon [The First Echelon] (1956)
Tuǵan jer [Land of the Fathers] (1966)
Qyz-Jibek (1970)
Oni srazhalis’ za rodinu [They Fought for their Country] (1975)†
Igla [The Needle] (1988)
Mest’ [Revenge] (1989)
Otyrardyń kúıreýi [The Fall of Otrar] (1991)
Kaırat (1992)
Kardiogramma [Cardiogram] (1995)
Kavkazskii plennik [Prisoner of the Caucasus] (1996)
Killer (1998)
Sëstry [Sisters] (2001)
Shıza [The Recruiter] (2004)
Nochnoi dozor [Night Watch] (2004)
Kóshpendiler [Nomad] (2005)
Ulzhan (2007)
Réketır [Racketeer] (2007)
Mongol (2007)
Tulpan (2008)
Qosh bol, Gúlsary! [Farewell, Gulsary!] (2008)
Baksy [Native Dancer] (2008)
Kelin (2009)
Baikonur (2011)
Jaýjúrek myń bala [Warriors of the Steppe] (2011)
Shal [The Old Man] (2012)
Stýdent [The Student] (2012)
Ya ne vernus’ [I Won’t Go Back] (2014)
Begletsy [Runaways] (2014)
Anaǵa aparar jol [The Road to Mother] (2016)
28 Panfilovtsev [Panfilov’s 28 Men] (2016)

Films of North and Central Asia:
Beloe solntse pustyni [White Sun of the Desert] (1970)
Dersu Uzala (1975)
Shaman (1996)
Skif [The Last Warrior] (2018)

Films about the post-Soviet condition:
Brat [Brother] (1997)
Brat 2 [Brother 2] (2000)
Bumer (2003)
Absurdistan (2008)
Ovsyanki [Silent Souls] (2010)

† Not a Kazakhstani film proper, but a Soviet film which had a significant impact on the popular consciousness in Kazakhstan, and the style and themes of Kazakh film culture.

11 June 2020

Holy and Glorious Apostle Barnabas of the Seventy


Saint Barnabas the Apostle

Today in the Orthodox Church, the eleventh of June, is the feast-day of Mitrofan (Chang) of Beijing and the two hundred twenty one martyrs with him in China, who were killed in the Yihetuan uprising. The Orthodox Christians of Beijing, originally Russian Cossacks of Albazin who intermarried with the indigenous Evenki people and were put under the Manchu Banner system, may be considered the spiritual heirs of Guo Ziyi, the Nestorian Christian general under the Tang Emperor Minghuang. I say this not in the sense that they were hæretical, but in the sense that they understood themselves as being fully Chinese and fully Christian. They were Chinese patriots faithful to the Qing Emperor, just as Guo Ziyi was loyal to the Tang Emperor.

But the connexion of China to Syria today is also significant, in that the Chinese Albazinians whose Orthodox faith led them to martyrdom was intimately connected with a Silk Road history. The Gate of Saint Thomas which that Apostle used to spread the Gospel from Damascus through Persia all the way to Kerala in India, was also used to bear the Gospel to the Chinese through the efforts of the monk Alopen (or Aluoben 阿罗本). The bearing of the Gospel over the Northern route, the Tea Road, by the Cossacks from Russia, was the next stage in that same mission.

The source and fount of that mission is also celebrated today, because the Orthodox martyrs of China share a feast-day with the Apostle Bartholomaîos of the Twelve and also with the Holy Apostle Barnabas, ‘a good man, and full of the Holy Ghost and of faith: and much people was added unto the Lord’. One of the Seventy whose deeds are committed to us by Luke the Evangelist in his Book of the Acts in Holy Scripture, he is membered particularly in Antioch and Cyprus.

Saint Barnabas [Gk. Βαρνάβας, Ar. Bârnâbâ بارنابا, Heb. Bar-Nabā’ בר-נבא], born Joseph, was a Jewish native of Cyprus, of the tribe of Levi, and may have been an uncle of the Holy Apostle and Evangelist Mark. Despite having been an observant Jew before his conversion, Barnabas belonged firmly to the ‘radical’ party in the Early Church, the party that believed the message of Christ was meant to be spread amongst the Gentiles without their having to first conform to the whole body of Jewish law. He is first mentioned in Acts 4, just after the disciples divided up all things equally amongst themselves so that no one had want: ‘Neither was there any among them that lacked: for as many as were possessors of lands or houses sold them, and brought the prices of the things that were sold, and laid them down at the apostles’ feet: and distribution was made unto every man according as he had need.’ Barnabas was one of those who possessed land and estates near Jerusalem, and he led by example. He sold all of these and gave the proceeds to the community without holding anything back.

Saint Barnabas next appears in the ninth chapter of Acts, after Apostle Paul – then Saul, hitherto an enemy of the followers of Jesus – was healed of his blindness in Damascus. It was Barnabas who convinced the other disciples that Paul was no longer their enemy, but a friend: ‘But Barnabas took him, and brought him to the apostles, and declared unto them how he had seen the Lord in the way, and that he had spoken to him, and how he had preached boldly at Damascus in the name of Jesus.’

From then, Saint Barnabas appears most prominently in Acts as a helper and fellow-traveller of Saint Paul. In the eleventh chapter we are told he was sent to Antioch by the disciples in Jerusalem in order to encourage the believers there, and he worked there together with Peter and Paul for several years. His name is mentioned alongside both of the Leaders of the Apostles in both cities. Barnabas was also in charge, along with Paul, of sending money for the relief of the needy Church of Jerusalem from the comparatively-wealthy Antioch during a period of famine. While they were in Jerusalem, Herod slew James the son of Zebedee, and then had Apostle Peter taken to prison together with the other chief apostles and placed under guard – both of which actions were calculated to increase his local popularity. An angel of the Lord, however, led Barnabas, Paul and Peter out of the prison. They hid at the home of ‘Mary the mother of John, whose surname was Mark’, who was Barnabas’s relative. When they returned from Jerusalem, Barnabas and Paul took with them this same John Mark.

Led by the Holy Spirit, Saints Barnabas and Paul left Antioch together for Cyprus to build up the Church, accompanied by John Mark. They were stuck for some time at Paphos where they were confronted by a sorcerer named Elymas. Elymas was stricken blind for a year after having attempted to prevent Barnabas and Paul from speaking with the Roman governor of Cyprus, named Sergius the Lesser, and then attempting to discredit the apostles with the governor.

They then travelled to Pergamos in Anatolia and from there to Pisidian Antioch, where they preached first to the Jews, and then to the Gentiles. Jealous of their success in preaching to great throngs of the Gentiles, the Jews began to circulate rumours about Barnabas and Paul to the Roman authorities, and had them expelled from the city. Barnabas and Paul made their way from thence to Ikonion (Konya), where they preached in the synagogues. They swayed a number of both the Jews and the Greeks to belief in Christ, but the remaining Jews and Gentiles both rose up against them and planned to stone them to death, and so they withdrew to Lystra to preach the Gospel there.

While in Lystra there was a man who met them, who had been born lame, and whose feet were crippled from birth. Saint Paul, looking upon him, commanded the man to stand up and walk, and stand and walk he did. When the people of Lystra saw this, they were much afraid, and began to worship Saint Barnabas as Zeus, and Saint Paul as Hermes. The pagan priest of Zeus went and gathered cattle and garlands with which to make sacrifice to them, but Saints Barnabas and Paul, on hearing of this, went out into the crowd and tore their clothes, telling them that they were but passionate men like themselves, and through their preaching and healing sought only to turn them away from vain sacrifices towards the living God. The people listened to them, and did not offer sacrifice. However, several anti-Christian messengers from Pisidian Antioch and Ikonion came to Lystra and swayed the people against Saint Paul and Saint Barnabas; and indeed they took Paul and stoned him nearly to death, and had him thrown out of the city. The disciples protected Saint Paul’s body, though, and he went back into the city and took Barnabas back with him to Derbeia.

Saint Barnabas was also at the forefront of the deliberations over whether or not the Gentiles could accept the faith of Christ without instruction in the Jewish law, including circumcision. The Book of Acts tells us that, at the Council of Jerusalem, Paul and Barnabas were both of the party that said the Gentiles could be saved without the entirety of the Law and without being circumcised. The Council agreed with them, though it retained the Mosaic strictures against fornication, idolatry, eating blood and eating meat from animals that had been strangled.

Barnabas and Paul continued to teach and preach in Antioch, and eventually Saint Paul asked Saint Barnabas if he would take another voyage with him, to visit the churches they had set up in their previous voyages and see how they were faring. Saint Barnabas agreed, but wanted to take John Mark with him. Paul was not amenable to this idea, because Mark had not accompanied them into Pamphylia. Paul and Barnabas fell out with each other over this dispute, and Barnabas took Mark and left for Cyprus; while Paul took Silas with him and ministered to the churches in Syria and Cilicia. It would appear that the rift between Saint Paul and Saint Barnabas was later healed, since Paul mentions Barnabas in favourable terms in his first epistle to the Corinthians.

At any rate, after the events related to us in the Book of the Acts, Barnabas continued his mission in Cyprus, where he multiplied the number of the believers, and undertook voyages into Italy, being perhaps the first of the Apostles to preach in Rome and later setting up a church in Mediolanum – that is, Milan. Upon his return to Cyprus, his fellow Jews on the isle who did not accept Christ instigated the pagans against him. The traditional narrative has it that Barnabas was tortured and then stoned to death at Salamis; another tradition says that he was placed in a halter and then dragged through the streets before being burned to death. In either event, Barnabas’s body was found unharmed by his kinsman Mark, who buried him in a secluded cave that was anchored by the roots of a carob tree. Mark placed in his arms a copy of the Gospel of Saint Matthew, which the Apostle had copied by his own hand.

According to Church historian Dr Andrea Mitsidi, in the year 478 a certain Archbishop Anthemios of Cyprus was visited three times in a vision by Saint Barnabas, who led him to the cave in which John Mark had buried him. The wondering Archbishop, upon awakening, found the carob tree as it had been shown to him, and upon digging among its roots found the cave, and found also the intact incorrupt body of the holy Apostle, still hugging to him the Gospel of Saint Matthew. This Gospel, the Archbishop Anthemios took with him and presented to the Emperor Zēnō. The Emperor thereupon granted the three Imperial privileges to the Church of Cyprus: the porphyry mantle which is worn by the Archbishop of Cyprus on feast-days; the cinnabar ink with which the Archbishop of Cyprus affixes his signature; and the Imperial sceptre which the Archbishop of Cyprus is permitted to carry. The autocephaly of the Church of Cyprus was thereby assured.

The holy Apostle Barnabas is therefore remembered with particular fondness by the Orthodox Churches of Cyprus and of Antioch, in both of which cities he was active and instrumental in establishing the Christian faith. Holy Apostle Barnabas, tireless servant of God in the spread of the Gospel in Cyprus and in Syria and in Asia Minor, pray unto Christ who established the world that our souls may be saved!
Apolytikion of Apostle Barnabas, Tone 3:

Holy Apostles Bartholomew and Barnabas,
Entreat the merciful God
To grant our souls forgiveness of transgressions.

02 April 2020

Dersu Uzala: Man is small before the face of nature


Vladimir Arsen’ev (Yuri Solomin) and Dersu Uzala (Maksim Munzuk) in Dersu Uzala

I am unfortunately not as well-versed in the filmography of Kurosawa Akira 黑澤明 as I ought to be. The ones which I recall seeing, and all of which I have thoroughly enjoyed, have been Rashômôn, Ikiru and Yume. I’ve only just finished watching Dersu Uzala now, and it is truly one of the most sublime and visually-stunning movies I’ve yet seen. It’s also one which I really should have watched a long time ago when doing this series on North and Central Asian films, because it really places a film like Shaman in context.

Dersu Uzala was a Mosfilm production, but Kurosawa demanded – and was given – full creative control over the screenplay and the direction. That is indisputably for the best. The artistry of the movie is spectacularly lush, a bold and sumptuous 70-millimetre canvas of riotous hues and dazzling lights and darks: the greens, yellows and reds of the forest palette; the masterful use of light and shadow to convey size and distance; the atmospheric effects of sunlight, moonlight, snow, steam and smoke. This movie is, in a word, iconic. The cinematographic ‘language’ Kurosawa uses in Dersu Uzala should be instantly and intimately familiar to Star Wars fans. George Lucas clearly had been watching the sun and moon shot as his inspiration for the Tatooine horizon in Star Wars; the frozen lake sequence as his inspiration for Hoth in The Empire Strikes Back; and the forest scenes in the second half of the film as his inspiration for Endor in Return of the Jedi.

Yet – for all the compliments Lucas paid this film’s imaginative depth in his own work – this is no space opera, but a very much this-worldly ballad of survival in which a small band of men is pitted against the gorgeous ferocity of the Far East Russian taiga and everything it can throw at them: blizzards, raging rapids, traps, bandits and tiger attacks. Humanity manages to weather the spirits of nature, on account of the reverent decency, wisdom and gentleness of one human being in particular.

The screenplay of Dersu Uzala is actually based on the real-life memoirs of Captain Vladimir Klavdievich Arsen’ev, a surveyor and explorer who worked first for the Tsarist government in Russia, and later for the socialist Far Eastern Republic. In 1902 while surveying the lakes of the Ussuri region, he met and came to depend on the eponymous local guide. Dersu Uzala is a trapper and hunter who belongs to the Hezhen [also Hezhe 赫哲, Nanai Нанай or Gol’dy Гольды] people, a tribe closely associated with the Evenkil, the Manchu and the Udegei, with whom they share a common body of lore and traditional shamanic religious customs (though nowadays the Evenki are mostly Orthodox, the Manchu Chinese folk religionists, and the Hezhen and Udegei Vajrayâna Buddhists).

Warning: spoilers below.

Despite an awkward and ambiguous first meeting, Vladimir Arsen’ev (Yuri Solomin) comes to like and admire Dersu (Maksim Munzuk), who has a deep reverence for the forest, and regards all animals and all forces within the woods and hills of the taiga as ‘people’ deserving of the same respect. In addition to being (of course) a deadly sharpshooter, Dersu has unparalleled tracking skills and powers of observation, and is often able to deduce from minute details including touch and smell what transpired in a given place several days back. When Dersu leads Arsen’ev and the military contingent accompanying him to a cabin, and furthermore described the old Chinese traveller who had been there some days before, Arsen’ev begins to trust the trapper to greater degrees.

Dersu Uzala assists in Arsen’ev’s survey mission, and saves Arsen’ev’s life on multiple occasions. He and Dersu get separated from the military unit and lost on a frozen lake just as a blizzard begins to blow up; to escape freezing to death, Dersu and Arsen’ev cut down and bundle the long dead stalks of grass on the lakeshore, and after Arsen’ev collapses from cold and exhaustion Dersu is able to construct a makeshift shelter with it, using the captain’s surveying tripod as a tent frame. Arsen’ev’s men are able to find them once the blizzard passes. Continuing their survey, Dersu assists them in other ways: when their food is running low and they’re at risk of starving, he helps them find an Udegei urireng which has made a catch of fish. While they’re in the shirangju Arsen’ev extends an invitation to Dersu to join him in the city, but Dersu refuses, and says he must leave their company the following day. Arsen’ev, sombre but grateful for Dersu’s help, offers him food and money, and Dersu replies that he can hunt his own food and trap sable furs for money. Instead Dersu reluctantly asks for cartridges, and these Arsen’ev’s men gladly give him. Dersu parts ways with Arsen’ev’s company when they reach the KVŽD.

Five years later, Arsen’ev is mapping the topography of Ussuri. Arsen’ev misses his old friend and hopes to meet him again, and indeed, when one of his soldiers reports that an old Hezhen trapper is asking for Arsen’ev by name, he jumps up and goes to greet him – not even taking his gun despite the young soldier’s precautions. Dersu gladly joins Arsen’ev’s party again as a guide. Once more they rely on his help, as when they need to ford a river by a raft and one of Arsen’ev’s men loses a pole in the river, setting the raft adrift. Dersu pushes Arsen’ev off the raft and tells him to swim ashore. And then it falls to Arsen’ev’s men to save Dersu, who clings to a log in the river to save himself from the rapids beyond, which are vicious enough to destroy the raft.

Dersu spends the rest of the autumn in Ussuri with Arsen’ev’s expedition, and Arsen’ev recollects it warmly, saying that his fondest memories of Dersu are from that autumn. But autumns in Siberia are short. Arsen’ev’s party happens across a part of Ussuri which is frequented by tigers, but also by predators of a more mundane sort: honghuzi 红胡子, or ex-Boxer rebels who have taken to banditry in the border country. The honghuzi make their living by trapping, but Dersu is appalled at their methods, saying that they kill more than they need. They also prey on local Chinese people, stealing the women and leaving the men bound up in mosquito-infested waters to die. Arsen’ev and Dersu free the living animals from the traps, rescue the imprisoned men, and assist the local Chinese baojia 保甲 militia – led by a certain Zhang Bao (Súımónkul Chokmarov) – in hunting down the honghuzi. Later they come across a tiger who has been following them. In order to save Arsen’ev, Dersu shoots the tiger, wounding it. Chagrined, Dersu drops his rifle, and explains to Arsen’ev that the tiger will run until it dies, and then the lord of the forest Kanga (similar to Ilmun Han in the Tale of the Nišan Shamaness) will send another tiger to kill him for this bad deed.

Dersu sinks into an ill mood after that, lashing out at the other members of the party and alienating them. He also begins to lose his eyesight – and for a rifle-hunter like Dersu, that is an irreparable loss. His fears of the tiger’s vengeance also begin to grow, and Dersu takes up Arsen’ev on his offer of hospitality. Arsen’ev allows Dersu to move in with his wife Anna (Svetlana Danilchenko) and his young son Vova (Dmitri Korshakov) in Khabarov, and they all welcome him warmly – in particular Vova, who hero-worships Dersu. However, Dersu faces difficulty in adapting to city life. He cannot understand why people sell water and firewood when they should be able to go out and get it for free. He cannot understand why people aren’t allowed to shoot guns inside the city. And he becomes listless being caged up in a ‘box’ and longs to sleep outside. After he is arrested for trying to chop down a tree in the city park, he asks Arsen’ev if he can return to the hills, since he knows he can’t live in the city. Before he leaves, Arsen’ev gives Dersu a rifle – the latest model, so that he can’t miss even with his poor eyesight.

At the end of the film, Arsen’ev gets a telegram saying that a dead Hezhen has been found with his name-card on him, and the investigator is requesting a positive identification from him. Arsen’ev goes to where they found the body, and on seeing him confirms that it is Dersu. The investigator is surprised on hearing that he is a hunter, saying he found no gun near the body. When Arsen’ev tells him he’d given Dersu a new rifle, the policeman speculates that he might have been killed for it. The policeman orders his assistants to bury Dersu, and Arsen’ev stands his walking stick up at the head of his grave.

End spoilers.

Dersu Uzala seems to be something of an inspirational touchstone, not only for Star Wars here in the West but also for the whole genre of Siberia-based survival films. One can see deliberate echoes of both Kurosawa’s cinematographic and thematic preferences in the Ermek Tursynov films Kelin and Shal, for example. Given Rustam Mosafir’s self-avowed admiration for Kurosawa and for genre film in general, it’s little surprise that there should be deliberate echoes of Dersu Uzala in Begletsy: both the colour palette of the forest scenes, and the character of the Evenki hunter who helps the runaways and muses on the strange and contradictory lusts of the white man for gold and for otherworldly bliss. And, of course, in Shaman we see the same tensions between a hostile but beautiful and bewitching Siberian taiga, and the city life to which the main character cannot return.

In a sense, then, Dersu Uzala can be seen to belong firmly in the tradition of the Ostern: the transposition of the American Wild West onto the Eastern frontiers of Russian and Soviet expansion into North and Central Asia. But despite the sumptuous settings and Kurosawa’s obvious affection for his Siberian wildscapes, this is not a film about primordial antiquity versus modern encroachment, nor – despite Dersu’s frequent disparagements of the greed and wastefulness of poachers or certain of the city folk – is it necessarily an œcologically-minded film, though those elements are present as well.

The struggle for survival is the story structure which allows Kurosawa to dwell on the purely human elements that struggle exposes. It really is a film about the friendship between these two men. And it is about the genuine sweetness, generosity, hospitality and reverence of Dersu Uzala himself. Dersu may be considered a continuation of Kurosawa’s bushidô-influence ideal type, particularly with his sharpshooting skill and his intimate knowledge of and respect for nature. But his temperament is very far from martial. Although his entire family was killed by a smallpox outbreak, ostensibly caused by the encroachment of the Cossacks, there is nothing in him that suggests any sort of desire for revenge. (Yes, even we box-dwelling types can learn a thing or two from Dersu in our day and age.) Instead, his character is marked by humility, generosity even for people he might never see, selfless compassion for those in danger. There is much more of the Eastern Orthodox solitary hermit about him than the daimyô.

To conclude: Dersu Uzala is powerful, profound and sublime. Though it’s considered a minor work in Kurosawa’s opus, not necessarily having the drama of Rashômôn or the dynamic action of The Seven Samurai, there’s still plenty here to hold one’s interest. It truly is worth watching for the masterful camerawork and the obvious affection for the land that Kurosawa was moved to use wide-gauge high-resolution film to contain. I can’t possibly recommend it highly enough.

30 March 2020

Shaman: A taiga duet for the violin and Jew’s harp


Dmitri (Igor Gotesman) and his horse in Shaman

I confess, I was a bit gun-shy of joint French productions set in northern or central Asia, after the unfortunately-pretentious Ulzhan. The 1996 French-Russian film Shaman, though, proved to be far more watchable and engaging. The film is centred around two escaped prisoners from a gulag in Siberia, and the efforts of the fish-out-of-water Dmitri to survive in a hostile environment.

The relationships between the violinist Dmitri (Igor Gotesman) and the Sakha, or Yakut, prisoner Anatoli (Spartak Fedotov), and later between Dmitri and his horse, undergird the whole of the film. As with Ulzhan, there is a journey underway with a destination at the end in mind, that never gets reached. Also as with Ulzhan, there is a mystical-spiritual element to this journey that is consonant with shamanism and which also incorporates some arthouse filmic conceits. Unlike Ulzhan, however, there are real stakes built up for the characters, and the beliefs and worldview of the Sakha are made to carry some real weight. Dmitri actually manages to be likeable in spite of his early ineptitude – in part because we can see early on that he cares about and respects Anatoli.

Warning: spoilers below.

Dmitri, a violinist from Moscow, mounts an escape from a labour camp in Siberia after discovering a prayer tree decked with flags and a herd of wild Yakut horses. He tells his fellow-prisoner Anatoli about what he discovers, and Anatoli helps him to smuggle his violin out of the camp, and rope and tame one of the horses. Anatoli advises Dmitri to take off his prisoner tag and hang it from the tree if he wants to make it far. The two of them ride off but are shot at by the camp guards, and Anatoli is hit in the back. The wound proves deadly. The Sakha believes that his fate is because of the anger of the spirits, who are punishing him for greed in taking an extra horse from the herd. The disbelieving Dmitri asks him how he knows, and Anatoli replies that he is a shaman. His dying wish is for Dmitri to place the amulets he brought out from the camp around his body.

Dmitri’s subsequent attempts to survive in the taiga range from the serious to the comical as he has to outwit and outrun cold, hunger, wolves, and his pursuers in the Red Army and Soviet police (who have helicopters and jeeps). He makes some early mistakes that nearly cost him his life and freedom – like lighting a fire in the open, or letting his horse run free before it trusts him. Everything in the taiga has a spirit. And the spirits of the taiga – so Anatoli warns Dmitri – do not come running with a baby bottle in hand. Dmitri is forced to sharpen his wits and his survival skills.

Dmitri manages to survive, however, it seems in part as a result of the intervention of the spirits. Along the way, Dmitri runs across a cast of supporting characters who are as unpredictable as the taiga itself. In some cases, the circumstances in which he meets them are so surreal that we are led to wonder if these are truly people or visions of spirits sent to help or hinder him. He meets a part-time poacher who works on a reindeer-herding kolkhoz. He meets Anatoli’s kindly but dying mother. He meets a trapper and his son who want to turn him in to the Soviet government for the reward money. And – my personal favourite – he meets a motorbicycling, leather jacket-sporting, aviator goggles-rocking, ambiguously-mad ‘Cossack to the Tsar’ who calls Dmitri ‘muzhik’ and helps him rescue his loyal Yakut horse, which he deeply admires but advises Dmitri to have shod lest it get a limp. In a rowdy Siberian bar he also meets a Buryat blacksmith to shoe his horse – who is the spitting image of his friend Anatoli. And on board one of the ice-bound lake ships he meets a pigeon-breeder who clearly doesn’t have it all together.

He eventually makes his way to Irkutsk, where he sells his horse to a travelling Roma whose daughters admire it. We see that in Irkutsk he can’t really ‘make it’ after having spent so long in the taiga. He seems shell-shocked among crowds and on streets, and he doesn’t even have the capacity to drink vodka after so long. He instinctively flees from the police on the streets, who don’t recognise him or care that he’s there. He finally avails himself of a public shower and hits on a nurse, who takes him out for dinner and a dance. He can’t decide what he wants off the menu, just saying ‘I want to eat.’ And of course it seems he’s forgotten how to properly use a knife and fork. This rather amuses his date. The nurse takes him back to her apartment in Irkutsk and asks him to stay. Dmitri opens his violin case briefly, but then puts it away. He then takes out Anatoli’s Jew’s harp and begins playing it as the sun rises over the lake. In the last scene we see Dmitri riding his horse out of Irkutsk as a train goes by the opposite way, and a Roma boy is shown playing Dmitri’s violin.

End spoilers.

The score of Shaman, though sparse, is integrally important to this film, and much of it consists of violin playing in harmony with the Jew’s harp – representing the coöperation of the spirit of Anatoli with Dmitri, and sometimes the inner conflict in Dmitri as he tries to make his way back to Moscow through the taiga. As is to be expected, the cinematography is broad and sweeping, and deliberately dwarfs the vulnerable Dmitri and his horse against the frigid landscape, which ultimately conquers him. That includes dense evergreen forests, fathomless snowdrifts, and vast frozen lakes (including the great Baikal) stretching out every way toward the horizon in which are caught boats ranging from canoes to great modern shipping tankers, rusting uselessly in the ice. The subtext is clear: modern technology is not necessarily of avail against the elements. Not a particularly Soviet sentiment!

The film delights in shocking us out of complacency, and it does this often by contrasting the vast, bleak winterscapes of Siberia with the intrusions of modern Soviet technology. The Sakha kolkhoz features yurts with radio antennæ. The Russian village which might as well have been a seventeenth-century Cossack colony is governed from a prefab police station with a Soviet flag. And then all of a sudden we see Dmitri riding his horse in front of an industrial shipping-yard in Irkutsk. The juxtaposition is jarring and it suddenly seems like we are in a different movie: we are made to feel the same disorientation and ‘unreality’ of this urban landscape that Dmitri does as he wanders into town.

The acting ability of Igor Gotesman is exemplary here – and he can do it well without having to speak. His long, drawn face and piercing blue eyes manage to convey excellently the vulnerable ingenuousness of his early escape, and also the experience of the weather-beaten survivor toward the end. He is an excellent counterpart to the normally-jovial Spartak Fedotov, who can become convincingly commanding at the drop of a pin – their unlikely friendship is rendered believable by their shared struggle. Their friendship bolsters the thematic tension in the film between mistrust of strangers (sometimes genuinely justified) and the need for mutual assistance in the face of the harsh environment. Another thematic consideration, consonant with the shamanic relationship with the wilderness in such a marginal biome, is the thin and often permeable distinction between sanity and madness. Very often it’s the ‘mad’ ones who prove to be most benign and helpful – like the pigeon-breeder living on the ship, or the Cossack biker who helps Dmitri rescue his horse.

I’ve made several comparisons of this film to Ulzhan up front, which I feel probably isn’t fair. Shaman is a far superior film, one which is quite a bit more subdued and ‘realistic’, but actually manages to plumb deeper into its material than the quixotic meandering treasure-hunt which is left unresolved in the other film. Perhaps a better comparison would be to the Kazakhstani prison-break-and-survival film Begletsy, though Shaman is more of a buddy flick than a romance, and the questions posed and answered by the film are quite different. Shaman gets off to a glacially slow start, but it convincingly builds up the sympathy and dramatic tension one would expect from a survival film of this kind.