09 June 2012

The problem of public morality in China

The Peking Duck (however much I may disagree with its primary author on a broad array of issues pertaining to China) has an excellent link to, and some very insightful comments on, the most recent podcast from Sinica with Tang Dynasty and Spring and Autumn founder and public intellectual Kaiser Kuo, my professor at Capital Normal University Dr David Moser, Jeremy Goldkorn and Didi Kirsten Tatlow on the topic of public morality in China. This podcast is absolutely brilliant, of a calibre one might expect from having several incredibly incisive minds tackle a problem as thorny as this one is, and I would highly recommend listening through the whole thing. They cover a number of topics, including freedom of expression, the historical roots of the ‘moral vacuum’ in contemporary Chinese society going back to the New Culture Movement, the roles of religion and culture in the modern debate, including Maoism, Buddhism, Christianity, and the Confucian revival (including Yu Dan!), the role of schools, the legal culture and many other points.

Of course, the most interesting bits of the conversation, to my mind, were the ones which attempted to delve into the historical questions: can we chalk up China’s suzhi question to the actions of the Chinese Communist Party, to specific events, to economic shifts or to the culture prior to modernity? I think Mr Kuo and Dr Moser make the point strongly that the disruptions in Chinese culture accompanying the advent of scientism, the revolutions (including the Republican, the Communist and the Cultural) and the reform and opening period have had an incredibly detrimental impact on the public sphere, such as it was. On this point I think they are quite persuasive, but on other points I think there could stand to be a bit more parsing. The idea that in the Chinese mindset the ‘public sphere’ doesn’t exist, per se, seems to me a bit off: in the upper echelons of Chinese society, the civil service and those associated with it were the civil society par excellence, of course sanctioned by the government but nonetheless capable of influencing the entire course of government in many cases. Lower down one had the lineage associations – though one could make the argument that these are ‘family’ arrangements, in practice they were much more flexible than that, and could be altered to allow in or exclude people from other families for a whole host of common purposes. Religious associations also performed these functions.

Another point that should be emphasised is the role and significance of overseas Chinese communities. The Chinese communities in California and Indonesia were very close-knit and formed a number of civil connexions (up to and including the political societies – the Baohuanghui and the Xingmenghui – which evolved into the modern Guomindang), and were well-noted in their host countries for the exemplary public behaviour of their members (even if these communities were socially insular whether by intent or by political and physical necessity). The big question that remains, then, is what happened on the mainland? On the one hand, that question has all too many readily obvious answers, most of which were covered by the discussants on the podcast. On the other hand, there are difficulties with placing too much emphasis on any one of these answers – not the least of which are the political ones, and I think this podcast does a good job of pointing out and doing well to avoid some of the many ‘mines in the field’.

I actually would also tend to be a trifle more optimistic regarding Confucianism’s chances at providing a moral compass for Chinese society. Most of the panelists seemed to agree that, as a philosophy, it had its definite upsides, even if they tended to be sceptical (Ms Tatlow in particular) of its potential abuses by the powers-that-be. I would actually take the opposite tack – historically speaking, Confucianism has been just as much an implement of social critique to the point of outright rebellion as it has been a tool for an authoritarian state to bolster its control. Now, this might be the result of an ad hoc means of self-preservation by a group of scholarly elites, but it has had definite power in creating legitimate and authentic mass movements for social and economic reform. Though the Self-Strengthening Movement and the social upheavals it inspired may have defaced much of Confucius’ moral authority in Chinese culture, I think it is at least arguable that there would be no New Culture movement without the organising principles of people like Kang Youwei. The resurfacing of Confucian spiritualists like Yu Dan and radical-conservative academic political philosophers like Kang Xiaoguang speaks to an enduring place for Confucius in the Chinese moral landscape.

But, gentle readers, please do listen to the podcast. It is certainly thought-provoking!

2 comments:

  1. Thanks for these comments, they're very perceptive and spot on. This podcast was pretty difficult, I think, because the topic is so intractable and fraught with cross-cultural perils, like stereotyping, oversimplification and racism. I felt like I never quite articulated what I wanted to convey in a coherent way, so I'm glad to see from your comments that at least the thread of all those observations was evident in the conversational clutter. I do agree (and I think the other three would agree) with most of your comments here, your points are well made. One point we blurred a bit was the difference between "civil society" and the notion of "morality in the public sphere". China does have a history of both facets, but each of these has been damaged by the ravages of last 100 years, and particularly the Mao period. And it is the latter one that the Chinese public most keenly feels the loss of. Anyway, a joy to read your thoughtful post, and I'll keep following you. David

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  2. Hi David! Thanks for visiting, and thank you for the comments! Again, I thought you guys did quite a good job of sidestepping the stereotypes and oversimplifications. Given the constraints you were under, the quality of the discussion was sterling - and Kaiser wasn't lying when he said you could go for another hour on the subject, which seems more fit for a week-long cross-disciplinary academic symposium than for an hour-long radio show.

    But the point that in China one can have it both ways between seeing it as an ancient culture and seeing it as a 'new culture' with regard to its civil society, I thought, was an important one. The Qing policy of keeping key scientific and cultural developments to themselves and out of the mainstream of Chinese popular culture as long as possible was probably in hindsight the first of the major 'breaks', given that it made the eventual transition to modernity all the more traumatic when it did happen, when the realisation hit that China was no longer the centre of the cultural / military / moral universe. At that point, at least if I'm reading my history correctly, it seemed like 'all bets were off' - as far as the intellectual and cultural world of China was concerned, it really was a very 'Wild West'-like time period. I actually would be very interested to hear you and Kaiser and Jeremy and Didi go another round on that topic alone.

    Welcome again, and thanks for commenting; I'm very happy to have you reading my blog, and look forward to talking more with you (whether here or on Facebook)!

    All the best,
    Matt

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